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Two alternative hypotheses – referred to as opportunity- and stigma-based behavior – suggest that the magnitude of the link between unemployment and 
crime also depends on preexisting local crime levels. In order to analyze conjectured nonlinearities between both variables, we use quantile regressions ap-
plied to German district panel data. While both conventional OLS and quantile regressions confirm the positive link between unemployment and crime for 
property crimes, results for assault differ with respect to the method of estimation. Whereas conventional mean regressions do not show any significant effect 
(which would confirm the usual result found for violent crimes in the literature), quantile regression reveals that size and importance of the relationship are 
conditional on the crime rate. The partial effect is significantly positive for moderately low and median quantiles of local assault rates.
Introduction
According to an annual survey on the fears of German 
citizens (Ängste der Deutschen, conducted by insurer R+V 
Versicherung) the fear of becoming a victim of a criminal 
offense regularly ranks high on the list. In 2014, 26 percent 
of respondents stated that they were afraid of becoming a 
victim of a criminal offense. Although there was consider-
able variation across states in that year (from 38 percent in 
Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg to 21 percent in Rhein-
land-Pfalz and Saarland), there is remarkably little vari-
ation in the national figure over the years of this century: 
in 2013 an all-time low was reached with 24 percent, while 
the highest value was 33 percent in 2002. This is in line 
with the observation that in Germany crime rates them-
selves were stable (or rather declined slightly) between 
2003 and 2013 (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik [PKS] 2003, 
2013) but show considerable variation across states. In 
addition to being one of the major fears, criminal activity 
is associated with large costs. According to Entorf and 
Spengler (2002), estimates of costs of crime range between 
4 and 7 percent of GDP in most industrialized countries. 
Another fear which generally ranks among the top five is 
rising unemployment. This fear was expressed by roughly 
50 percent of respondents in the early 2000s, increased to 
68 percent in 2005 (when unemployment was particularly 
high in Germany with about five million registered unem-
ployed), vanished from the top seven fears in 2007 and 
2008 but was again expressed by more than 60 percent in 
2009 and 2010 (when the financial crisis was expected to 
hit the German labor market). As with the fear of victimiz-
ation, there is also large cross sectional variation in the fear 
of rising unemployment and in the unemployment rate 
itself.
In this paper we reconsider the complex link between 
unemployment and crime using Germany district panel 
data. The economic rationale why such a link might exist is 
the following: Declining labor market opportunities 
(manifested in an increasing unemployment rate) worsen 
legal income opportunities and therefore make crime more 
attractive. This idea was first formulized by Becker (1968). 
The many other studies focusing on the unemployment-
crime relationship include Cantor and Land (1985), Young 
(1993), Levitt (2001, 2004), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 
(2001), Gould et al. (2002), Edmark (2005), Öster and 
Agnell (2007), Lin (2008), Phillips and Land (2012), Las-
tauskas and Tatsi (2013), and Sieger (2014). These studies 
differ with respect to various aspects: estimation methods 
Does the Magnitude of the Link between Unemployment 
and Crime Depend on the Crime Level? A Quantile 
Regression Approach
Horst Entorf, Department of Applied Econometrics and International Economic Policy, Goethe University, Frankfurt 
am Main, Germany
Philip Sieger, Department of Applied Econometrics and International Economic Policy, Goethe University, Frankfurt 
am Main, Germany
IJCV: Vol. 8 (2) 2014, pp. 262 – 283
Entorf and Sieger: A Quantile Regression Approach to Unemployment and Crime  264
used, period and country under consideration, and con-
clusions drawn with respect to the magnitude of the effect 
of unemployment on crime. Lin (2008, 414) summarizes 
the results: “In terms of empirical evidence, recent studies 
reach consensus that unemployment does have a positive, 
significant but only small effect on property crime, and no 
effect on violent crime.” 
We depart from existing studies by applying quantile 
regression methods, which allow the identification of non-
linear crime-unemployment relationships (for example, a 
high impact of unemployment on crime for low-crime 
regions and a low impact for high-crime regions). That 
particular pattern would be consistent with a hypothesis of 
opportunity-based behavior: Those who become unem-
ployed in a low-crime area have higher incentives to com-
mit a crime than those in high-crime regions, because they 
would face less effective prevention by potential victims 
and lower competition from other criminals. However, 
there could also be an opposite nonlinear pattern, which 
we call the stigma-based hypothesis. This predicts low mar-
ginal effects from increasing unemployment rates in low-
crime areas, because here any potential detection bears a 
higher risk of stigma than in regions where criminal beha-
vior is more common. These examples show that there are 
good reasons to take a closer look at the unemployment-
crime relationship using quantile regressions. Surprisingly, 
there is little research based on this technique in the crimi-
nological literature. To the best knowledge of the authors, 
the only contribution is Bandyopadhyay et al. (2015). 
Based on time-series evidence from six crime categories 
and forty-three police force areas, they confirm not only 
that unemployment does increase crime but that it does so 
more in high-crime areas. Moreover, they find that the 
crime-reducing effect of higher detection rates is stronger 
in low-crime areas.
The quantile analysis conducted in this paper is based on a 
panel data set covering about four hundred German Land-
kreise (districts) and urban municipalities (kreisfreie Städte) 
for the years 2005 to 2009 in Germany. The same source 
(German districts and urban municipalities) has recently 
also been used by Messner et al. (2013) and Lastauskas and 
Tatsi (2013).
1. Factors of Crime
1.1. Economic Factors
Legal income opportunities represent an important factor 
of crime. Following Becker (1968), higher legal income 
should decrease criminal activity, because legal income 
represents part of the opportunity costs of conviction. 
Higher legal income prevents a potential offender from 
committing a crime because they fear losing it. All other 
things being equal (probability of detection and conviction 
and illegal income opportunities) higher legal income is 
expected to decrease criminal activity. However, if one 
switches from a micro to a macro perspective, there is 
another channel through which legal income affects crime. 
If average legal income in a certain region (as a German 
district) increases, the potential offender is on the one 
hand more likely to have a higher legal income, and hence 
less likely to commit a crime. On the other hand, a higher 
average legal income might also increase illegal income 
opportunities, since now there is more income or wealth to 
steal from. At least for property crime, a higher legal aver-
age income could therefore also increase criminal activity. 
Mobile criminals from other regions might also be 
attracted. This would increase the utility of committing a 
crime and, in turn, also the likelihood of rising local crime 
rates (note that crime rates are registered in the city or dis-
trict where the crime is committed). The effect of dispos-
able income is therefore ambiguous, since it influences the 
decision to commit a crime (or not) through different 
channels.
The potential channel through which unemployment 
affects the crime rate has already been briefly mentioned 
above: Declining labor market opportunities (manifested 
in an increasing unemployment rate) worsen legal income 
opportunities and therefore make crime more attractive. In 
their influential paper, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001, 
262) express this idea as follows: “Conceptualizing criminal 
activity as a form of employment that requires time and 
generates income, a ‘rational offender’ should compare 
returns to time use in legal and illegal activities and make 
decisions accordingly. Holding all else equal, the decrease 
in income and potential earnings associated with involun-
tary unemployment increases the relative returns to illegal 
activity.” The idea of time allocation between legal and 
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illegal activities and its influence on the decision to par-
ticipate in criminal activities was formalized in a theor-
etical framework by Grogger (1998). As Raphael and 
Winter-Ebmer (2001) lay out, Grogger’s model implies 
four different employment-crime situations which can be 
used to predict how unemployment affects criminal activ-
ity. For individuals who engage in both criminal activity 
and job market activity, the model predicts that unem-
ployment increases time allocated to crime. For individuals 
who do not work in the regular job market but only com-
mit crimes, an unemployment spell cannot affect the time 
allocated to criminal activity. For workers not committing 
crimes, the effect of unemployment depends on whether 
the return to the first hour of criminal activity exceeds the 
reservation wage. Individuals whose reservation wage is 
high are unlikely to be pushed into crime by an unem-
ployment spell. Individuals with comparably low reserva-
tion wages are more likely to be influenced by 
unemployment and might try to offset lost income by 
engaging in criminal activity. Thus, Grogger’s model pre-
dicts that for two out of four situations an unemployment 
spell will increase time allocated to criminal activity (and 
thus increase the crime rate), while for the remaining two 
cases, there is no response to an unemployment spell. 
Applying the model to regional data, theory would predict 
that responses to changing unemployment rates should be 
smaller in regions with already high crime rates than in 
regions where crime rates are low (given that reservation 
wages are not prohibitively high).
1.2. Demographics, Education, and Urbanity
Becker’s (1968) seminal economic model of crime 
abstracts from some important features of the criminal’s 
decision problem. Several other determinants of crime 
have been discussed in the literature besides deterrence 
variables (probability of conviction or severity of punish-
ment). One of these is the age structure of society. As out-
lined by Farrington (1986), who focuses on the United 
Kingdom and the United States, the age-crime curve 
usually peaks in teenage years and declines afterwards. 
Grogger also provides evidence for this phenomenon: 
“Thirty five percent of all Philadelphia males born in 1945 
were arrested before the age of 18, and one-third of all 
Californian men born in 1956 were arrested between the 
ages of 18 and 30. The 1990 census counted 1.1 million 
persons in jail, the vast majority of whom were men in 
their twenties and thirties.” (1998, 756). Similar patters can 
be observed for Germany. Those aged 6 to 20 make up 26.1 
percent of all crime suspects but only 13.7 percent of the 
population, while those aged 40 and above make up 32.4 
percent of all crime suspects but 56.9 percent of the popu-
lation (PKS 2009). Given the descriptive evidence and the 
mostly accepted empirical evidence from other studies (for 
example Freeman 1996),1 it seems imperative to include 
age structure as a further control variable when it comes to 
explaining crime. One would expect the proportion of 
people of crime-prone age in the population to have a 
positive influence on criminal activity. Younger people are 
also victimized more often (PKS 2009, table 91), so a larger 
proportion of young people might therefore foster criminal 
activities in two ways: it increases both the supply of crimi-
nals and the supply of victims.
Data from the German police statistics (PKS) show that 
non-German crime suspects make up 21.1 percent of all 
crime suspects, although contributing only 8.7 percent of 
the total population (PKS 2009).2 Possible reasons for this 
huge overrepresentation are discussed in Albrecht (1997). 
He mentions, among other things, deprivation and control 
theories, which focus on problems of social integration and 
reduced opportunities to develop ties to mainstream 
society. The reasons for the apparent overrepresentation of 
foreigners in criminal activity will not be discussed in 
detail here, but the numbers indicate the need to control 
for the composition of the regional population.
Overrepresentation of crime suspects can be observed in 
yet another demographic group: men. Inspection of the 
1 Levitt (1999, 2004) argues that the age structure 
alone has only a limited influence on the evolution of 
crime rates, because the decline in crime rates during 
the time period from 1995 to 2004 in the United 
States was at odds with a rising share of the most 
crime-prone demographic age group of young males.
2 Even after excluding those offenses which can only 
be committed by non-Germans (such as offenses 
against asylum law), the numbers only go down to 
19 percent (2003) and 19.4 percent (2009) respect-
ively (PKS 2009, 105).
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raw numbers tells the following story: in 2009, out of the 
2.19 million crime suspects, 1.64 million were male (75 
percent). Controlling for the gender composition of the 
respective district hence seems to be as important as con-
trolling for the demographic variables discussed above.
Another determinant of criminal behavior is education. 
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive data on edu-
cational attainment of the German population at the dis-
trict level. The only variable that covers education at the 
district level is the proportion of workers subject to social 
security contributions who have not completed vocational 
training (sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigte ohne 
abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung). This variable only covers 
the education of a certain group, namely those who are 
subject to social security contributions. The predicted 
influence of this variable on crime is therefore hard to 
determine: on the one hand, less educated people are 
expected to commit more crimes. One could therefore 
expect a positive influence of this variable on crime. On the 
other hand, a high proportion of workers subject to social 
security contribution not having completed vocational 
training means that there are good labor market oppor-
tunities even for unskilled workers. Under this interpre-
tation, a higher proportion of such workers would have a 
negative effect on crime. Empirical evidence for this can be 
found in Gould et al. (2002).
The last determinant discussed in this section is population 
density. There are several theories why population density 
might be an important determinant of crime. On the one 
hand, densely populated areas (usually large cities) feature 
a weaker net of social control (Glaeser and Sacerdote 
1999). The anonymity of the city makes it easier for indi-
viduals to commit crimes, since the potential stigma 
involved in being caught is less. In addition, similar to the 
argument applied above to age composition, a high popu-
lation density makes a “match” between criminal and vic-
tim more likely. Criminals may also have greater access to 
the wealthy in urban areas. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999, 
227) also mention the possibilities that criminals face a 
lower probability of detection and arrest in urban areas 
and that urban areas themselves attract (or create) crime-
prone individuals. These theoretical considerations are 
confirmed for the data set used in this analysis. The bivari-
ate correlation between overall crime rates and population 
density is remarkably high, with 0.63. One would therefore 
expect a positive impact of population density on crime 
rates.
2. Data Used
The empirical analysis is based on data covering districts 
(Landkreise) and urban municipalities (kreisfreie Städte) in 
Germany. Landkreise usually include one or more moder-
ate-sized towns, as well as villages and rural areas, whereas 
municipalities are organized as stand-alone communities 
(kreisfreie Stadt). In the following, both urban municipal-
ities and rural counties will be referred to as “the dis-
tricts.”3 This section introduces the variables included and 
presents detailed summary statistics. Crime data (number 
of offenses and clearance rates) are collected by regional 
state offices of the German Federal Criminal Police Office 
(Bundeskriminalamt) and are published in Polizeiliche Kri-
minalstatistik (PKS, police criminal statistics). Covariates 
come from two sources: unemployment and employment 
data are gathered by the German Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), whereas demographics 
and income data are obtained from the Federal Statistical 
Office (Statistisches Bundesamt).
2.1. The Dependent Variables
The dependent variables used in this study are the crime 
rates in each district. Before defining the term “crime 
rates” we describe which offenses are included. These are 
burglary, auto theft, and assault. The offenses are defined as 
follows in the German penal code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB).4
3 Messner et al. (2013) prefer to use the German 
word “ Kreise,” because they differ from counties or 
districts in the United States. For example, large city 
such as Houston may be within a district with other 
large cities; however, in Germany Houston would be 
a stand-alone community kreisfreie Stadt, i.e. 
counted as “Kreis”.
4 The translation covers the most important points. 
German speaking readers are referred to the original 
source.
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• Burglary (Wohnungseinbruchsdiebstahl, §244 Abs. 1 Nr. 
3 StGB): entering a home by force or deception with the 
intention of stealing property. 
• Auto theft (Diebstahl in/aus Kraftfahrzeugen, §242 
StGB): Stealing a car or stealing property from a car.
• Assault (Körperverletzung, §223–227, 229, 231 StGB): 
Bodily injury, dangerous bodily injury, maltreatment of 
wards, serious bodily injury, bodily injury resulting in 
deaths, negligent bodily injury, participation in a brawl 
(see the official translation of the German Criminal 
Code: http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.
htm#223) 
“Crime rates” are defined as the frequency ratio (Häufig-
keitszahl) from the German police statistics. This is the 
number of cases (of a given offense) reported to the police 
per 100,000 inhabitants in the district where the crime was 
committed. As is pointed out in the PKS (for example PKS 
2003,14), the explanatory power of the frequency ratio is 
limited by the fact that only part of the committed crimes 
are reported to the police and by the fact that illegal aliens, 
foreign tourists and transients might also commit crimes 
but are not counted as inhabitants of Germany. However, 
the latter restriction is negligible: in 2009 out of the 
2,187,217 crime suspects only 46,132 (or 2.11 percent) 
were illegal aliens and 6,739 (0.31 percent) were foreign 
tourists and transients, adding up to only 2.42 percent of 
all crime suspects. A slightly broader perspective, which 
also includes asylum seekers (22,137 or 1.01 percent) and 
stationed armed forces, including their family members 
(2,249 or 0.1 percent), produces a share of 3.53 percent of 
all crime suspects. The second problem of unreported 
crimes is more severe, though it can be mitigated by using 
fixed-effect models (see below).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the frequency 
ratio for burglary, auto theft, and assault. It is apparent that 
there is huge variation in the respective crime rates. The 
overall distribution of the frequency ratio for auto theft is 
displayed in Figure 1, which nicely visualizes what can also 
be inferred from percentiles in Table 1. Although the maxi-
mum frequency ratio for auto theft is 2,437 (recorded in 
Bremen in 2007), the 95 percent percentile is only 878.5, 
with a median of only 246. The minimum is as small as 20, 
recorded in the district Forchheim (Bavaria) in 2008. 
Hence the distribution is heavily skewed. Moreover, the 
geographical distribution (Figure 2) shows a north-south 
pattern with higher frequency ratios in the north. Urban 
municipalities, at least in the south (Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg), do not stand out particularly on visual 
inspection of Figure 2.
Table 1: Frequency ratios for burglary, auto theft, and assault (descriptive statistics)
Percentile
5%
25%
50%
75%
96%
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard deviation
Burglary
22
47
84
138.5
275
3
605
105.05
79.19
Auto theft
66.5
138.5
246
413
878.5
20
2437
325.68
274.18
Assault
325
421
538.5
704
1094.5
202
2108
597.06
242.45
Note: Statistics based on 3,020 pooled annual district and urban municipality data points for 2003 to 2009. Due to administrative reforms, the number of districts fell from 438 in 2003 to 412 in 
2009. Frequency ratio is the number of reported offenses per 100,000 inhabitants.
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Similar patterns hold true for the frequency ratio for bur-
glary. Here, too, we observe a heavily right-skewed dis-
tribution and enormous variation. The minimum 
frequency ratio for burglary is only 3 (Hildburghausen, 
Thuringia, 2008), with the 5 percent percentile as low as 22. 
In contrast, the maximum frequency ratio of 605 
(Cologne, North Rhine-Westphalia, 2003) is about two 
hundred times the minimum. The distribution over the 
whole time period under consideration and the graphical 
visualization of the distribution in 2009 are displayed in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. Noteworthy is the clus-
tered appearance of burglaries in the north and west, while 
the south-west does not exhibit high frequency ratios even 
in the urban municipalities.
Figure 1: Distribution of frequency ratio auto theft, 2003 to 2009
Figure 2: Regional distribution of frequency ratio auto theft, 2009
Figure 3: Distribution of frequency ratio burglary, 2003 to 2009
Assault, with a minimum frequency ratio of 202 (Enzkreis, 
Baden-Württemberg, 2003) and a maximum of 2,108 
(Neumünster, Schleswig-Holstein, 2007), does not show as 
much variation as the other offenses. The ratio of mini-
mum to maximum is lower (ten compared to one hundred 
for auto theft and two hundred for burglary). In addition, 
the distribution is more symmetrical than to the other dis-
tributions (Figure 5). Urban municipalities are among the 
most heavily affected districts for assault. They clearly 
stand out in the geographical distribution for 2009 (Figure 
6). Besides the urban municipalities, the city states Berlin, 
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Bremen, and Hamburg, the region around the city of 
Hannover, and the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan region all 
show elevated frequency ratios. The contrast between the 
south and the north is less pronounced than it is for auto 
theft or burglary.
Figure 5: Distribution of frequency ratio assault, 2003 to 2009
Figure 4: Regional distribution of frequency ratio burglary, 2009
One possible objection to using crime rates at district level 
is that criminals do not necessarily live in the district where 
they commit the crime. For the offenses under consider-
ation, however, about 75 percent of criminals live in the 
district where they committed the crime (PKS 2009). 
Figure 6: Regional distribution of frequency ratio assault, 2009
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2.2. Economic Explanatory Variables
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the explanatory 
economic variables: unemployment rate and net household 
income. As unemployment is the major variable of interest, 
it is important to know its exact definition. The unem-
ployment rate is defined as the number of unemployed 
persons divided by the total workforce. This raises the 
question who is counted as an unemployed person and 
which persons are considered to be in the workforce. 
According to the German Social Security Code (Sozialge-
setzbuch 3 [SGB 3], §16 Abs. 2), a person is to be con-
sidered unemployed if he or she
1. is temporarily not in an employment relationship or 
works less than 15 hours per week,
2. is looking for employment subject to social security 
contributions,
3. at the disposal of the employment agency,
4. has registered as unemployed at the employment agency.
The workforce consists of all persons in dependent civilian 
employment plus all self-employed persons and helping 
family members.
The unemployment rate varies considerably across Ger-
man districts. The district with the lowest unemployment 
rate during the period under consideration is Eichstätt 
(Bavaria) (1.6 percent, 2008). The district with the highest 
rate is Uecker-Randow (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) 
(29.3 percent, 2004). Figure 7 shows the distribution of 
unemployment rates during the period under consider-
ation. It is right-skewed with a peak at about 8 percent. A 
considerable number of districts (more than 5 percent) 
experienced unemployment rates exceeding 20 percent. 
The geographical distribution of unemployment rates in 
(Figure 8) shows that even nineteen years after Reunifi-
cation, the new German states still lag behind in terms of 
labor market success. Districts with unemployment rates 
higher than 10 percent are almost exclusively located in 
eastern Germany (along with a few urban municipalities in 
the west, especially in the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan area), 
where very few districts have a rate smaller than 7 percent. 
The vast majority of districts with rates below 5 percent are 
found in the south (Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg), 
while in the rest of Germany rates range between 5 and 10 
percent.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for economic variables
Percentile
5%
25%
50%
75%
95%
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard deviation
Unemployment rate
0.039
0.061
0.087
0.130
0.202
0.016
0.293
0.100
0.051
Net household income 
(euros)
29,907
34,747
39,650
43,527
49,845
24,545
69,030
39,520
6,289
Note: Statistics based on 3,020 pooled annual district and urban municipality data points from 
2003 to 2009. Due to administrative reforms of geographical boundaries, the number of dis-
tricts changed from 438 in 2003 to 412 in 2009.
Figure 7: Distribution of unemployment rate, 2003 to 2009
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The variation in net household income is less pronounced 
than the variation in unemployment rates using the coef-
ficient of variation as a measure of dispersion. The lowest 
average net income was reported in Leipzig (Saxony) in 
2003 with 24,545, while the highest one was reported in 
Starnberg (on the periphery of Munich, Bavaria) in 2006. 
50 percent of districts have an average net household 
income between 35,000 and 44,000. Only 5 percent have 
less than 30,000 and only 5 percent have more than 
50,000. As already mentioned, only in very few districts is 
average household income above 50,000.
2.3. Other Explanatory Variables
The share of workers subject to social security con-
tributions without completed vocational training (median 
= 15.6 percent, mean = 15.2 percent; from here on referred 
to as the share of unskilled workers in the workforce) has 
been introduced as factor representing the prevailing level 
of education. However, as described above, it is not entirely 
clear whether this variable truly captures education or 
rather job opportunities for unskilled workers. The share of 
unskilled workers in the workforce is low in the new federal 
states, high in the south-west, and rather mixed in the rest 
of Germany, suggesting that the share of unskilled workers 
in the workforce captures labor market opportunities for 
unskilled workers rather than educational attainment. For 
example, the small and medium-sized and manufacturing 
businesses concentrated in Baden-Württemberg seem to 
offer jobs to unskilled workers, whereas the economic situ-
ation in the new German states is generally less beneficial. 
The lowest share of unskilled workers in 2009 (7.3 percent) 
was reported in Greiz (Thuringia), the highest share (30.6 
percent) in Tuttlingen (Baden-Württemberg).
Deterrence plays a crucial role in economic models of 
crime. The severity of the expected punishment and the 
probability of arrest are deterrence measures that 
influence the likelihood of committing a crime. The size of 
the police force (Levitt 1997, Lin 2008), the incarceration 
rate (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001, Phillips and Land 
2012), and the clearance rate (Entorf and Spengler 2000) 
are frequently used in empirical analyses. Although theory 
suggests that it is imperative to include a variable that 
measures some form of deterrence, some studies fail to do 
so (Öster and Agell 2007, or Yearwood and Koinis 2009). 
Based on data availability, we follow Entorf and Spengler 
and use the clearance rate as a measure of deterrence. The 
clearance rate is defined as the number of “solved” cases in 
a given year as a percentage of the total number of crimes 
recorded by the police in the same period (PKS 2009, 14). 
A case is considered to be “solved” when a suspect is 
identified and a charge is laid, regardless of whether the 
accused is convicted. As some cases reported in the pre-
vious year are solved in the current year, this might result 
in a clearance rate greater than 100 (which indeed hap-
pened in the period under consideration). Clearance rates 
significantly differ by type of crime. Whereas average 
clearance rates are rather low for burglary (26.0 percent, 
median 23.2 percent) and car theft (15.4 percent, median 
12.8 percent), the rate for assault is 90.7 percent (median 
91.2 percent).
Figure 8: Regional distribution of unemployment rate, 2009
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The demographic structure plays a key role in explaining 
criminal behavior. The share of the population aged 15 to 
24 (mean = 11.8 percent, median 11.7 percent; referred to 
as the youth population) ranges from 8.9 percent in Greiz 
(Thuringia, 2009) to 17.7 percent in the urban municipal-
ity of Greifswald (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 2005) 
with. Turning to the share of the population aged 25 to 54 
(referred to as the “active population”; mean 42.6 percent, 
median 42.4 percent) one can observe a close-to-normal 
distribution with a slightly more pronounced right tail 
(maximum 49.3 percent, in Heidelberg, minimum 37.4 
percent, in Lüchow-Dannenberg (Lower Saxony).
Population density, the share of males, and the share 
foreigners complete the list of explanatory variables. In 
Germany, population density varies considerably from 38 
per square kilometer in Mecklenburg-Kreilitz to 4,282 in 
Munich. The mean population density (512 inhabitants per 
square kilometer) does not convey much information 
about the “typical” district: more than 70 percent of all dis-
tricts have a smaller population density than this mean, 
which is inflated by a small number of extremely densely 
populated areas (the median is 197). The district with the 
lowest share of males is Baden-Baden (Baden-Württem-
berg) with a share of 46.0 percent (recorded in 2004) while 
the district with the highest share is Aachen (North Rhine-
Westphalia) with 51.5 percent (recorded in 2009). 95 per-
cent of all districts have male shares less than 50 percent 
during the period under consideration, so in almost all dis-
tricts there are more women than men (mean 49.0 percent, 
median 49.1 percent). However, it turned out that the vari-
ation of males across districts and over time is rather low 
and highly collinear with other factors of the population 
structure such that we had to omit it from the econometric 
analysis. The share of foreigners varies considerably across 
German districts. The lowest share of foreigners was rec-
orded in Sömmerda (Thuringia) in 2007 with only 0.7 per-
cent, while the highest share was recorded in Offenbach am 
Main (Hesse) in 2003 with more than 26 percent. A look at 
the percentiles shows that there are many districts with 
rather low shares of foreigners (50 percent have rates lower 
than 5.8 percent; mean 6.8 percent), while there are few 
districts with high shares of foreigners (5 percent of the 
districts have shares of foreigners higher than 15 percent).
3. Methodology
Ordinary least squares regressions determine the con-
ditional mean of a response (dependent, endogenous) vari-
able given values of explanatory (exogenous) variables. In 
this section we go beyond this standard method and also 
analyze the relationship between unemployment and crime 
using quantile regression (for example Koenker 2005). This 
technique has been proposed to discover relationships in 
cases with unequal impacts of explanatory variables for 
different ranges of the dependent variable. Hence, quantile 
regression allows identification of relationships even when 
there is no relationship or only a weak relationship 
between the means of such variables, but perhaps one at 
the median or in lower or upper parts of the distribution. 
Therefore, application of quantile regression seems to be 
promising in regional data sets with uneven distributions 
of the response variable, which is certainly the case for the 
heavily skewed distribution of crime rates across regions.
3.1. Mean Regression
The starting point for the empirical analysis is the follow-
ing model specification for the dependence of crime on 
unemployment:
(1) 
The coefficient of interest is β which captures the effect of 
unemployment in year t in district i on crime in year t in 
district i. The vector of parameters γ captures the influence 
of other explanatory variables as demographic, economic, 
or deterrence variables. The θs are time-fixed effects and 
capture the influence of shocks on the crime rate which 
affect all districts in the same way. εi,t denotes the error 
term.
This model specification suffers from unobserved heteroge-
neity (for example due to region-specific shares of unre-
ported crimes) which would lead to inconsistent and biased 
OLS estimates. The problem can be tackled by utilizing the 
panel structure of the data. Panel data are superior to a 
pooled cross-section in that the former allows the 
researcher to consider unobserved effects (or individual 
fixed effects). They are able to capture time-invariant (or 
slowly changing) factors that influence the crime rate and 
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are specific to a certain district (rural areas, for example, are 
fundamentally different from urban areas). These factors 
can all be lumped together in the fixed effects. Their inclu-
sion can therefore help to mitigate the problem of omitted 
variables (Wooldridge 2002, 247). Note that the use of ran-
dom-effects (RE) modelling does not provide a reasonable 
alternative to the fixed-effects approach used in this study. 
Consistency of RE panel data modelling requires that 
unobserved factors of unobserved heterogeneity (the αis, 
see below) are uncorrelated with included regressors. This 
presumption seems rather unrealistic as observed factors 
such as local unemployment, income, or clearance rates are 
most likely related to unobserved factors such as the share 
of unreported crime in the region. Nevertheless, it should 
also be noted that including fixed effects is no cure-all 
against omitted variable biases, because factors such as the 
share of unreported crimes may change over time. They are 
only useful when included observed factors change much 
faster than excluded unobserved factors. We assume that 
this is plausible for the data under comparison.
By including these fixed effects, the resulting regression 
equation reads:
(2) 
where αi denotes the fixed effect for district i and ui,t is the 
new error term. Although the αis are unobservable it is still 
possible to estimate the parameters of interest in equation 
(2) by subtracting the (over time) mean of each district 
from the respective observation (or, equivalently, by 
including district dummy variables). Denoting mean 
values by overlining, the regression equation reads:
(3) 
Note that the unobserved effect no longer appears in 
equation (3), but the parameters are the same as in 
equation (2). It is hence possible to estimate the parameters 
of interest by applying OLS to equation (3).
This specification might still suffer from the potential 
problem that unemployment is not an exogenous variable 
in equation (3). Econometric endogeneity problems 
(inconsistency and biasedness of parameter estimates) arise 
when regressors are correlated with residuals of the statis-
tical model. The major reason for endogeneity of unem-
ployment can be suspected in a potential correlation 
between unemployment and unobserved factors in the 
error term, such as the degree of regional social disruption 
and social control. This shortcoming relates to the omitted 
variable bias discussed above. A further potential reason for 
endogeneity is simultaneity, which might for instance 
occur when high local crime rates have a reversal effect on 
corresponding labor markets. The potential endogeneity of 
unemployment in crime equations is beyond the scope of 
this article, but has been addressed at length elsewhere 
(Raphael and Winter-Ebmer [2001] and Lin [2008]; Las-
tauskas and Tatsi [2013] and Sieger [2014] consider Ger-
man district data). Experience from previous research has 
shown that the likelihood of potentially biased parameters 
on unemployment is much smaller when panel data are 
used and time as well as district effects are included.
3.2. Quantile Regression
While mean regression delivers a single parameter estimate 
for the average partial effect of unemployment on crime, 
quantile regression allows different impacts of unem-
ployment on crime depending on the level of criminal 
activity. This is useful for several reasons. For instance, one 
might find an insignificant effect of unemployment on 
crime in mean regressions, while there is in fact a negative 
(and significant) effect of unemployment on crime for 
low-crime areas and a positive (and significant) effect for 
high-crime areas. In mean regressions both effects would 
simply cancel out, leaving the researcher with the false con-
clusion that unemployment does not affect crime. More-
over, as suggested by the Grogger (1998) model, it makes a 
difference whether a certain percentage change Δu* of the 
unemployment rate hits a region with few criminals, or a 
region with a comparatively large proportion of full-time 
criminals. Quantile regression can therefore be seen as a 
tool for deeper inspection of the results of the mean regres-
sion, a path that does not seem to have yet been pursued in 
the context of analyzing the relationship between crime 
and unemployment (with the notable exception of Band-
yopadhyay et al. 2015).
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Mean regression estimates the conditional mean function, 
given values of explanatory variables. That function 
describes how the mean of the dependent variable 
changes with the vector of explanatory variables. The 
underlying assumption is that the error term in the 
regression equation has the same distribution indepen-
dent of the values of the explanatory variable. Instead of 
predicting the mean of the endogenous variable, quantile 
regressions aim at predicting the quantiles of the reges-
sion, i.e., the median (50 percent median), 25 percent, 75 
percent etc. However, there is a possibility that the 
explanatory variables influence the conditional dis-
tribution of the dependent variable in many other ways: 
stretching one tail of the distribution, inducing multi-
modality, or expanding its dispersion (Koenker and Hal-
lock 2001, 143). Investigating these other possibilities 
might offer a more detailed view on the relationship 
between the dependent and explanatory variables. In par-
ticular, it might shed light on the question whether the 
effect of unemployment on crime differs between dif-
ferent levels of crime.
There are (at least) two alternative crime-unemployment 
links that are imaginable from a theoretical point of view:
i) A declining crime-unemployment link, where the effect 
of unemployment on crime is high in low-crime areas 
and low in high-crime areas.
ii) An increasing crime-unemployment link, where the 
effect of unemployment on crime is low in low-crime 
areas and high in high-crime areas.
These two different crime-unemployment relationships 
correspond to two different interpretations of how crimi-
nals react to the level of criminal activity. A declining 
crime-unemployment relation would give rise to what we 
call opportunity-based behavior. It would also be in line 
with the Grogger (1998) model. When criminal activity is 
low, the supply of crime is highly elastic (that is, crimi-
nals show strong responsiveness to changing incentives). 
Hence, in such situations an increase in unemployment 
has a relatively large impact on crime: There are attractive 
and unprotected victims and only few competitors. If 
there are only a few drug dealers in the street, becoming a 
drug dealer is more profitable than if there are already 
many drug dealers around. If there are only a few bur-
glars around, trying to break into a house is more profit-
able (maybe also because people do not invest so much in 
crime-preventing equipment such as alarm and warning 
devices). If crime is already high, that means the “crime 
market” is already rather saturated, and engaging in 
criminal activities after becoming unemployed is not as 
attractive anymore. Then the supply becomes inelastic 
and the effect of unemployment on crime would be lower 
or insignificant. At a first glance, the reasoning seems 
plausible for property crimes, but less so for violent 
crimes such as assault. However, it also makes a difference 
for violent crimes whether the marginal crime effect of a 
certain change of the unemployment rate Δu* hits a 
neighborhood of less protected citizens in low-crime 
areas or a region of already high crime rates where 
further increases become unlikely, in particular because 
more and more people have taken precautions and avoid 
risky places.
An increasing crime-unemployment link, on the other 
hand, would follow from what we call stigma-based beha-
vior. If criminal activity is low, being unmasked as a crimi-
nal creates a strong stigma, since the person concerned is 
one of only a few criminals. Funk (2004) describes stigma 
of potential detection as a crime deterrent. Higher unem-
ployment rates would not necessarily push a person into 
criminal activity, since the fear of the stigma prevents the 
potential offender from doing so. However, if there is 
already a lot of criminal activity, there is less impediment 
to becoming a criminal, since even detection would not 
make the person a “black sheep.” A rise in unemployment 
would hence more easily push the person into criminal 
activity.
3.2.1. Ordinary Quantile Regression
It might come as a mild surprise that quantiles, although 
linked to the operations of ordering and sorting, can also 
be defined via a simple optimization problem (Koenker 
and Hallock 2001, 145). Similarly to OLS, where estimation 
is based on minimizing a sum of squared residuals uit, 
quantile estimation is based on minimizing a sum of 
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weighted absolute residuals ρτ(uit). More precisely, estimat-
ing the conditional quantile function for quantile τ is 
achieved by solving the following minimization problem
(4) 
where β is the parameter of interest, ρτ(u) = [τI{u ≥ 0} + (1 
– τ) I {u < 0}] |u| = u(τ – I{u < 0}) is the asymmetric quan-
tile loss function (visualized in Figure 9),5 respectively 
weighting function of residuals uit, and ξ(xi,t , β) is some 
parametric function of explanatory covariates, which may 
include controls for time effects (these are included in per-
formed regressions but omitted here for notational conveni-
ence). In a first step, the parametric function will be a linear 
function of the explanatory variables and the parameters to 
be estimated, as the right hand side of regression equation 
(1), i.e. ξ(x'i,t , β) = xi,t β (in vector notation). This approach 
suffers from the same deficiencies described above, in par-
ticular that it is not fully exploiting the panel structure by 
using fixed effects and taking unobserved heterogeneity into 
account. This feature will be added in the next subsection. 
The interpretation of quantile regression coefficients fol-
lows the interpretation of ordinary regression coefficients, 
with the important difference that reported parameter esti-
mates only affect the quantile in question (instead of the 
mean). Thus, in the median regression the constant is the 
median of the sample while in the .75 quantile regression 
the constant is the 75th percentile for the sample, etc.
Figure 9: Quantile loss function
5 I denotes the indicator function taking the value 1 
if the expression in the cambered brackets is true 
and 0 otherwise.
3.2.2. Quantile Regression with Fixed Effects
The approach presented above might suffer from the prob-
lem of unobserved heterogeneity. Following Koenker 
(2004) we consider the following model for the conditional 
quantile functions of the dependent variable of individual i 
at time t:
(5) 
Where the ai again denote the individual fixed effect, xi,t is a 
vector of explanatory variables and the τ-dependent vector 
β is the vector of parameters to be estimated. In such 
models the fixed effects ai imply a pure location shift on 
the conditional quantiles of the response. Thus, the effects 
of the covariates are permitted to depend on the quantile, 
τ, whereas the effects ai do not, but they are still useful to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and can be inter-
preted in the way discussed above. In order to estimate 
model (5) for several quantiles simultaneously, Koenker 
(2004) proposes solving the following:
(6)
Note: See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a similar illustration.
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or, if the number of individuals is large relative to the 
number of time periods, a penalized version of (6), which 
reads as
(7)
ive offense lagged by one period,7 the logarithm of dispos-
able income, the logarithm of population density, the share 
of foreigners, the share of the young population (aged 
younger than 15), the share of the youth population (aged 
15 to 24), the share of the “active population” (aged 25 to 
55), the share of unskilled workers, and time dummies. The 
analysis covers the years from 2005 to 2009, although data 
are available from 2003 onwards. The reason for the choice 
of this time span is a major labor market reform (the so 
called “Hartz-Reform”) implemented in 2005. This reform 
had led to a redefinition of unemployment: Most people 
who were receiving social welfare benefits (Sozialhilfe) 
before 2005 have been counted as “employable” thereafter 
and therefore unemployed after 2005 (instead of being out-
of-the-labor force before). To avoid potentially biased 
results stemming from the changing definition of the 
unemployment rate, we restricted the time window to the 
years 2005 to 2009.
Table 3 displays the results of OLS and fixed effects mean 
regressions.8 The estimated parameters are to be inter-
preted as semi-elasticities: an increase of the unem-
ployment rate by one unit (one percentage point in this 
case) increases criminal activity by percent. Based on the 
standard OLS regression, unemployment has a positive and 
significant effect on crime for burglary (9.6 percent) and 
auto theft (10.3 percent), and a negative but insignificant 
effect on assault (-0.4 percent). These results are in line 
with previous findings from the literature: the unem-
ployment rate usually has a significant positive effect on 
property crimes (here burglary and auto theft) while only 
small or insignificant effects on violent crime, here 
measured in terms of assault. This is consistent with the 
vast majority of cross-section findings in the literature, and 
where the ωks are weights which control the relative 
influence of the q quantiles [τ1, … , τq ] on the estimation 
of the αi parameters (Koenker 2004, 77), ρτ(·) is again the 
quantile loss function and λ is a shrinkage parameter. For 
λ→0, one would obtain the fixed effect estimator based on 
optimizing (6), while for λ→∞ one would obtain an esti-
mate of the model purged of the fixed effects (Koenker 
2004, 78).6 A routine that implements this estimator (and 
variants of it) has been provided by Roger Koenker and 
Stefan Bache and is available for the statistical software 
package R. More recent work on fixed effects quantile 
regressions also deals with potential endogeneity of 
explanatory variables. The approach outlined in Harding 
and Lamarche (2009) tries to overcome this problem by 
extending the work of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) 
and developing an estimation technique which is able to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity on the one hand, but 
is also able to incorporate the idea of instrumental vari-
ables.
4. Estimation Results
4.1. Mean Regressions
Table 3 shows the results for the  two mean regressions 
applied in this study. The dependent variable is the logar-
ithm of the frequency ratio of the respective offense. 
Besides the unemployment rate, OLS regressions also 
include the logarithm of the clearance rate for the respect-
6 If the shrinkage parameter goes to infinity, the 
estimated fixed effects have to approach zero in 
order to find a minimum of equation (7).
7 Lagging the clearance rate by one period mitigates 
the problem of simultaneity.
8 Note that the maximal number of 398 districts 
used in the subsequent multivariate analysis differs 
from the one in Messner et al. (2013), who report 
results based on 413 districts. The difference might 
be explained by the way data are employed. As viol-
ent offenses can be rare events in less populated dis-
tricts (contrary to large cities and the more urban-
ized areas), Messner et al. decided to use the average 
annual robbery and assault rates per 100,000 popu-
lation for the three-year period 2005, 2006, and 
2007. By contrast, our paper fully exploits the panel 
data structure of the five years period from 2005 to 
2009, i.e. data are collected over time and over the 
same districts and then regressions (in form of panel 
econometric methods and quantile techniques) are 
run over these two dimensions. In turn, some dis-
trict observations are lost due to redefinitions of 
geographical district boundaries which took place 
during 2007 and 2009 in the East German states 
Sachsen-Anhalt and Sachsen (see Wikipedia 2015, 
for details of boundary reforms in Germany). 
Further observations are lost due to missing data of 
explanatory variables. Lastauskas and Tatsi (2013), 
who estimate cross-sectional spatial models based 
on data from 2008 and 2009, report the use of 402 
districts. In 2007 the total number of districts was 
still 439. This number fell (with time-variant 
boundaries) to 412 in 2009. As of 2015 there are 402 
districts (295 Landkreise and 107 kreisfreie Städte).
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even with findings on the influence of the contempor-
aneous unemployment rate on the assault rate in time 
series studies (Phillips and Land 2012). However, the OLS 
specification does not consider the panel structure, so 
regional peculiarities such as locally high or low shares of 
unreported crimes or unobserved factors of urbanity are 
not taken into account. The fixed effect regression (column 
FE in Table 3) does include district fixed effects and is 
therefore able to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
across districts.9 Applying it does not change the insig-
nificance of unemployment on assault, but parameters of 
the FE estimation on car theft and burglary differ substan-
tially from the ones of OLS estimation. The effect on auto 
theft becomes insignificant, and the estimated parameter 
on the link between burglary and unemployment is been 
reduced to 4.4 (recall that the median district unem-
ployment rate is about 9 percent, so a one percentage point 
fall would be equivalent to a -11.1 percent change experi-
enced by a median district).10
Reported inference is based on cluster-robust standard 
errors. The employed Stata command is based on the work of 
White (1980, 1984) and Huber (1964, 1967), and allows the 
assumption of independently distributed residuals to be 
relaxed. The routine produces consistent standard errors if 
the residuals are correlated within, but uncorrelated between 
clusters (districts). In spatial models it may be rather opti-
mistic to assume that the residuals are correlated within but 
uncorrelated between clustered regions. Beck and Katz 
(1995) suggested the application of panel-corrected standard 
errors (PCSEs) which correct for contemporaneous cor-
relation between the clusters. However, their approach is 
based on large T-asymptotics (a large time-series dimension), 
while our approach is based on a large cross-sectional dimen-
sion N, with N » T. Hoechle (2007) points out that the PCSE 
estimate will be rather imprecise if the ratio T/N is small. 
Thus, we stick with White-Huber robust standard errors, 
which seems to be justified as we only consider five years of 
data and also correct for time and district fixed effects.
Table 3: Results from the mean regression for the effect of unemployment on crime
Offense
Assault
Burglary
Auto theft
Number of observations
OLS
–0.364
(0.289)
9.634***
(0.909)
0.319***
(0.911)
1,947
FE
0.175
(0.382)
4.432***
(1.493)
–1.053
(0.851)
1,947
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: log (frequency ratio). OLS regressions include log(clearance rate) for the respective offense lagged by one period, log(dispo-
sable income), log of population density, share of foreigners, share of the young population, share of the youth population, share of the active population, share of unskilled workers and time dum-
mies. FE regressions include log (clearance rate) for the respective offense lagged by one period, log (disposable income) and time dummies. All regressions are weighted using the size of the district 
population. Note that due to regional reorganizations some districts had to be excluded from the data set. Further note that panel data analysis requires at least two subsequent periods with identi-
cal regional boundaries and without missing data. This was the case for 383 districts with five-year time spans, one additional district for the four-year time span between 2006 and 2009, and an ad-
ditional fourteen districts for the time span 2008/09, resulting in 1,947 observations. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
9 However, this comes at some costs. On inclusion 
of fixed effects all slowly varying or quasi time-
invariant variables became highly collinear and 
completely insignificant. For this reason share of 
foreigners, share of unskilled workers, and all other 
variables representing the population structure have 
been omitted from the fixed-effect specification.
10 Sieger (2014) confirms significance (respectively 
insignificance) and sign of presented FE results 
using an IV approach.
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4.2. Quantile Regressions
Table 4 gives an overview of the results for the ordinary 
quantile regression. Some interesting insights emerge from 
comparing the methods under consideration. While the 
estimated effect of an increase in the unemployment rate 
on the rate of assault was insignificant in the OLS regres-
sion (see Table 3), it is positive and significant in the ordi-
nary quantile regression at least for low levels of crime 
(the 5 percent and 25 percent quantiles). In addition, the 
strength of the crime-unemployment link is slightly 
decreasing (Figure 10). The downward slope is even more 
pronounced for burglary and auto theft (Figures 11 and 
12), giving rise to the interpretation that agents are com-
mitting crime when the “supply” of crime is rather low, 
and “tolerance” towards crime is still high (see also Ehr-
lich 1996, who argues that tolerance towards crime repre-
sents the demand side of a market of offenses). Moreover, 
OLS estimates are within the middle of the respective 
quantile regressions, supporting the apprehension that in 
the OLS regression the effects at different quantiles are 
simply averaged and do not reveal the full picture of the 
crime-unemployment relationship (but note that mean 
and median results differ due to the skewed crime dis-
tribution).
Table 4: Results from the ordinary quantile regression for the effect of unemployment on crime
Offense
Assault
Burglary
Auto theft
Quantiles
0.05
1.126*
(0.681)
15.185***
(1.212)
12.789***
(1.619)
0.25
0.947***
(0.307)
9.718***
(0.885)
9.835***
(0.741)
0.5
0.418
(0.333)
7.491***
(0.671)
8.829***
(0.689)
0.75
0.412
(0.392)
7.038***
(0.960)
8.579***
(0.889)
0.95
–0.715
(0.977)
5.924***
(1.051)
7.921***
(1.631)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: log (frequency ratio). All regressions are based on 1,947 observations and include log(clearance rate) for the respective offense lag-
ged by one period, log (disposable income), log (population density) share of foreigners, share of the young population, share of the youth population, share of the adult population, share of unskilled wor-
kers and time dummies. All regressions are weighted using the size of the district population. See Table 3 for details on data. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Figure 10: Effect of an increase in unemployment on assault at different 
quantileshere
Figure 11: Effect of an increase in unemployment on burglary at different 
quantiles
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Table 5 displays the results from quantile regression with 
fixed effects. Note that the usual inclusion of time-fixed 
effects has caused indications for serious multicollinearity 
problems such that we deviate from previous specifications 
by including a linear time trend instead of time dummies. 
We consider quantile regressions with fixed effects as the 
most reliable and preferred, as they control for potential 
district-specific unobserved heterogeneity. The significance 
of parameter estimates is in line with the one obtained 
from ordinary quantile regression, but the pattern of the 
unemployment-crime link has changed, in particular for 
property crimes. The effect on burglary and auto theft is 
still significant for all quantiles, but results do not confirm 
the decreasing pattern in Table 4 (where estimates below 
the 50 percent quantile of the regional crime distribution 
are particularly high). Instead, quantile parameters exhibit 
a rather flat crime-unemployment profile, which is not 
indicative for or against stigma or opportunity-based beha-
vior. The effect of unemployment on assault is significant 
for rather low-crime (25 percent-quantile) and median-
crime regions (50 percent quantile) and insignificance is 
confirmed for quantiles above 50 percent. This lack of sig-
nificance for high-crime areas is in line with opportunity-
based criminal behavior, but the FE approach does not 
confirm the strictly downward effect found with ordinary 
quantile regressions.11
Figure 12: Effect of an increase in unemployment on auto theft at 
different quantiles
11 Sieger (2014) also presents some preliminary 
quantile FE IV estimates. However, the results lack 
robustness and seem to be highly sensitive to the 
choice of specification such that we do not comment 
on them further in this paper.
Table 5: Results from quantile regression with fixed effects for the effect of unemployment on crime
Offense
Assault
Burglary
Auto theft
Quantiles
0.05
0.908
(0.570)
11.910***
(1.297)
12.416***
(1.505)
0.25
0.896**
(0.378)
10.990***
(1.383)
11.005***
(1.330)
0.5
1.344***
(0.432)
11.270***
(1.363)
11.706***
(1.079)
0.75
0.980
(0.856)
11.318***
(1.596)
12.628***
(1.560)
0.95
0.388
(1.610)
11.888***
(1.418)
14.434***
(1.943)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: log (frequency ratio). All regressions are based on 1,947 observations and include log (clearance rate) for the respective of-
fense lagged by one period, log (disposable income) and a linear time trend. All regressions are weighted using the size of the district population. See Table 3 for details on data. *, **, and *** de-
note significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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4.3. Further Results
Tables 6 and 7 show results for the effects of other factors 
of the economics of crime model: clearance rate and net 
income. In line with theoretical expectations, the log of the 
lagged clearance rate is negative and significant for all but 
one model specification. The only exception is the fixed 
effects mean regression of assault. The effect of the clear-
ance rate for property crimes ranges between -0.15 and 
-0.30. The much larger effect of a 1 percent change in the 
clearance rate for assault can be explained by its relatively 
high median clearance rate of 91 percent (compared to 
only 13 percent for auto theft, and 23 percent for burglary) 
and its low variation across districts. The quartiles at 25 
percent and 75 percent are 89 percent and 93 percent, 
respectively, such that a change by 1 percent (for instance, 
from a 90-percentile down to the 89.1-percentile) already 
represents a substantial change, in particular given that 
assault rates – in contrast to auto theft and burglary – do 
not show strong variation across districts (see above).12 So 
when interpreting and comparing parameter estimates it 
needs to be taken into account that increasing the clearance 
rate for assault by 1 percent would be more difficult, less 
likely, and perhaps also much more costly than increasing 
the clearance rate for property crimes by the same amount.
As regards the structure of the quantile regression estimates, 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2015) report that the crime-reducing 
effect of higher detection rates is stronger in low-crime 
areas. This can be confirmed for assault and using ordinary 
quantile regressions (as also applied by Bandyopadhyay et 
al.) in Table 6, whereas for fixed-effects and property crimes 
there is no obvious quartile-specific pattern.
Table 6: Results from pooled OLS and ordinary quantile regression
12 The 25% quartiles of auto theft and burglary are 
8.1% and 20%, respectively. The corresponding 75% 
quartiles are 15.6% and 33.9% (Sieger 2014).
Log(clearance rate), lag(-1)
Assault
Burglary
Auto theft
Net income
Assault
Burglary
Auto theft
POLS
2.762*** 
(0.275)
–0.313*** 
(0.035)
–0.201*** 
(0.027)
POLS
–1.265 *** 
(0.079)
–0.010 
(0.212)
–0.007 
(0.233)
Quantiles
0.25
–2.305*** 
(0.367)
–0.274*** 
(0.053)
–0.156*** 
(0.026)
Quantiles
0.25
–1.137*** 
(0.089)
–0.729*** 
(0.239)
–0.830*** 
(0.256)
0.5
–1.685*** 
(0.342)
–0.309*** 
(0.034)
–0.184*** 
(0.027)
0.5
–1.187*** 
(0.113)
–0.613*** 
(0.212)
–0.717*** 
(0.271)
0.75
–1.590*** 
(0.465)
–0.299*** 
(0.028)
–0.164*** 
(0.031)
0.75
–1.118*** 
(0.099)
–0.269 
(0.226)
–0.289 
(0.254)
Note: Cluster-robust (POLS) and bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: log (frequency ratio). See Tables 4 and 5 for further details. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Results for net income (Table 7) are more heterogeneous. 
The clearest empirical evidence can be observed for assault, 
where all estimates confirm the hypothesis that better legal 
earning opportunities are associated with lower crime 
rates. The same effect occurs for the 25 percent and 50 per-
cent percentiles (but not for the 75 percent percentile) of 
ordinary quantile regressions for auto theft and burglary. 
However, quantile fixed effects, pooled OLS, as well as stan-
dard mean FE modelling do not confirm this result so that 
we cannot reach a unanimous conclusion with respect to 
the effect on property crimes.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper uses regional panel data from about four 
hundred German districts and quantile regressions to 
study the effect of unemployment on crime. The main con-
tribution is to test the hypothesis that size and significance 
of the effect of unemployment on crime may depend on 
the relative position of the prevailing regional crime level 
within the overall distribution of crime rates, i.e. whether 
the local crime rate is relatively low or large. We present 
two conjectures about the non-linear pattern of the rela-
tionship between unemployment and crime. First, there 
could be a downward sloping crime-unemployment link 
with a high marginal impact of unemployment on crime 
for low-crime regions. This pattern might arise when job 
losses imply high incentives and relatively large oppor-
tunities to become criminals. Likewise, potential criminals 
would face less crime prevention and precautions from 
potential victims than those in regions where crime is 
already more elevated. The opposite pattern might follow 
from the alternative stigma effect: If there are only a few 
criminals around, there are strong moral obstacles to 
becoming a criminal, since any detection would make the 
person a “black sheep.” This contrasts to a situation with 
many criminals in the neighborhood where acting illegally 
becomes more likely as many others or even peers already 
have criminal experience. Empirical results show that con-
ventional mean regressions might indeed produce mislead-
ing results. For instance, while simple OLS and FE 
Table 7: Results from fixed effects means and quantile FE regressions
Log(clearance rate), lag(-1)
Assault
Burglary
Auto theft
Net income
Assault
Burglary
Auto theft
FE
0.214 
(0.182)
–0.091*** 
(0.025)
–0.040*** 
(0.011)
FE
–0.430** 
(0.197)
–0.810 
(0.770)
0.219 
(0.431)
Quantiles
0.25
–3.919*** 
(0.393)
–0.299*** 
(0.053)
–0.252*** 
(0.047)
Quantiles
0.25
–0.899*** 
(0.106)
0.593 
(0.391)
0.423 
(0.360)
0.5
–4.158*** 
(0.376)
–0.395*** 
(0.052)
–0.245*** 
(0.038)
0.5
–0.777*** 
(0.112)
0.220 
(0.403)
0.315 
(0.299)
0.75
–4.437*** 
(0.586)
–0.376***
 (0.039)
–0.278*** 
(0.041)
0.75
–0.844*** 
(0.170)
0.141 
(0.412)
0.261 
(0.382)
Note: Cluster-robust (FE) and bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: log (frequency ratio). See Tables 4 and 5 for further details. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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regressions depict insignificant results for assault (which 
would confirm the usual result for violent crime found in 
the literature), the preferred fixed quantile regressions 
reveal positive and significant effects for the districts repre-
senting the 50 percent and 25 percent percentiles of the 
crime distribution, i.e. for median- and low-crime regions, 
respectively. The analysis of property crimes illustrates that 
results based on quantile fixed effect modeling might sub-
stantially differ from those of ordinary quantile regres-
sions. The latter seem to indicate behavior in line with the 
opportunity-based approach (the effect of unemployment 
on crime in regions with relatively low crime rates is 
stronger than in regions with relatively high crime rates), 
but this result cannot be confirmed when including fixed 
effects. As this technique has the advantage that it corrects 
for unobserved heterogeneity and is therefore a favored 
estimation strategy, we may conclude that the positive and 
significant effect on considered property crime categories is 
rather constant across quantiles. This indicates a con-
ventional linear relationship between property crime and 
unemployment and corroborates standard theoretical 
explanations based on expected values of distributions and 
usual mean regressions. However, future work should also 
use individual data to identify and better understand the 
complexity of incentives and activities of potential crimi-
nals in high- and low-crime regions.
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